Introduction
For real-world technologies, such as self-driving cars [10] , autonomous drones [14] , and search-and-rescue robots [37] , the test distribution may be non-stationary, and new observations will often be out-of-distribution (OoD), i.e., not from the training distribution [42] . However, machine learning (ML) models frequently assign wrong labels with high confidence to OoD examples, such as adversarial examples [46, 29] -inputs specially crafted by an adversary to cause a target model to misbehave. But ML models are also vulnerable to natural OoD examples [21, 2, 48, 3] . For example, when a Tesla autopilot car failed to recog- Figure 1: The Google Inception-v3 classifier [44] correctly labels the canonical poses of objects (a), but fails to recognize out-of-distribution images of objects in unusual poses (b-d), including real photographs retrieved from the Internet (d). The left 3 × 3 images (a-c) are found by our framework and rendered via a 3D renderer. Below each image are its top-1 predicted label and confidence score.
nize a white truck against a bright-lit sky-an unusual view that might be OoD-it crashed into the truck, killing the driver [3] . Previous research has successfully used 3D graphics as a diagnostic tool for computer vision systems [7, 31, 47, 32, 50] . To understand natural Type II classification errors in DNNs, we searched for misclassified 6D poses (i.e., 3D translations and 3D rotations) of 3D objects. Our results re-veal that state-of-the-art image classifiers and object detectors trained on large-scale image datasets [36, 22] misclassify most poses for many familiar training-set objects. For example, DNNs predict the front view of a school busan object in the ImageNet dataset [36] -extremely well (Fig. 1a) but fail to recognize the same object when it is too close or flipped over, i.e., in poses that are OoD yet exist in the real world (Fig. 1d) . However, a self-driving car needs to correctly estimate at least some attributes of an incoming, unknown object (instead of simply rejecting it [17, 38] ) to handle the situation gracefully and minimize damage. Because road environments are highly variable [3, 2] , addressing this type of OoD error is a non-trivial challenge.
In this paper, we propose a framework for finding OoD errors in computer vision models in which iterative optimization in the parameter space of a 3D renderer is used to estimate changes (e.g., in object geometry and appearance, lighting, background, or camera settings) that cause a target DNN to misbehave (Fig. 2) . With our framework, we generated unrestricted 6D poses of 3D objects and studied how DNNs respond to 3D translations and 3D rotations of objects. For our study, we built a dataset of 3D objects corresponding to 30 ImageNet classes relevant to the self-driving car application. The code for our framework is available at https://github.com/airalcorn2/ strike-with-a-pose. In addition, we built a simple GUI tool that allows users to generate their own adversarial renders of an object. Our main findings are:
• ImageNet classifiers only correctly label 3.09% of the entire 6D pose space of a 3D object, and misclassify many generated adversarial examples (AXs) that are human-recognizable (Fig. 1b-c) . A misclassification can be found via a change as small as 10.31
• , 8.02
• , and 9.17
• to the yaw, pitch, and roll, respectively.
• 99.9% and 99.4% of AXs generated against Inceptionv3 transfer to the AlexNet and ResNet-50 image classifiers, respectively, and 75.5% transfer to the YOLOv3 object detector.
• Training on adversarial poses generated by the 30 objects (in addition to the original ImageNet data) did not help DNNs generalize well to held-out objects in the same class.
In sum, our work shows that state-of-the-art DNNs perform image classification well but are still far from true object recognition. While it might be possible to improve DNN robustness through adversarial training with many more 3D objects, we hypothesize that future ML models capable of visual reasoning may instead benefit from better incorporation of 3D information.
Framework

Problem formulation
Let f be an image classifier that maps an image x ∈ R H×W ×C onto a softmax probability distribution over 1,000 output classes [44] . Let R be a 3D renderer that takes as input a set of parameters φ and outputs a render, i.e., a 2D image R(φ) ∈ R H×W ×C (see Fig. 2 ). Typically, φ is factored into mesh vertices V , texture images T , a background image B, camera parameters C, and lighting parameters L, i.e., φ = {V, T, B, C, L} [19] . To change the 6D pose of a given 3D object, we apply a 3D rotation and 3D translation, parameterized by w ∈ R 6 , to the original vertices V yielding a new set of vertices V * . Here, we wish to estimate only the pose transformation parameters w (while keeping all parameters in φ fixed) such that the rendered image R(w; φ) causes the classifier f to assign the highest probability (among all outputs) to an incorrect target output at index t. Formally, we attempt to solve the below optimization problem:
In practice, we minimize the cross-entropy loss L for the target class. Eq. 1 may be solved efficiently via backpropagation if both f and R are differentiable, i.e., we are able to compute ∂L/∂w. However, standard 3D renderers, e.g., OpenGL [51] , typically include many non-differentiable operations and cannot be inverted [27] . Therefore, we attempted two approaches: (1) harnessing a recently proposed differentiable renderer and performing gradient descent using its analytical gradients; and (2) harnessing a non-differentiable renderer and approximating the gradient via finite differences. We will next describe the target classifier (Sec. 2.2), the renderers (Sec. 2.3), and our dataset of 3D objects (Sec. 2.4) before discussing the optimization methods (Sec. 3).
Classification networks
We chose the well-known, pre-trained Google Inceptionv3 [45] To test a target DNN, we build a 3D scene (a) that consists of 3D objects (here, a school bus and a pedestrian), lighting, a background scene, and camera parameters. Our 3D renderer renders the scene into a 2D image, which the image classifier labels school bus. We can estimate the pose changes of the school bus that cause the classifier to misclassify by (1) approximating gradients via finite differences; or (2) backpropagating (red dashed line) through a differentiable renderer.
al. [19] replaced the discrete pixel color sampling step with a linear interpolation sampling scheme that admits non-zero gradients. While the approximation enables gradients to flow from the output image back to the renderer parameters φ, the render quality is lower than that of our nondifferentiable renderer (see Fig. S1 for a comparison). Hereafter, we refer to the two renderers as NR and DR.
3D object dataset
Construction. Our main dataset consists of 30 unique 3D object models (purchased from many 3D model marketplaces) corresponding to 30 ImageNet classes relevant to a traffic environment (Fig. S2) . The 30 classes include 20 vehicles (e.g., school bus and cab) and 10 street-related items (e.g., traffic light). See Sec. S1 for more details.
Each 3D object is represented as a mesh, i.e., a list of triangular faces, each defined by three vertices [27] . The 30 meshes have on average 9,908 triangles (Table S1 ). To maximize the realism of the rendered images, we used only 3D models that have high-quality 2D image textures. We did not choose 3D models from public datasets, e.g., ObjectNet3D [52] , because most of them do not have high-quality image textures. That is, the renders of such models may be correctly classified by DNNs but still have poor realism. Evaluation. We recognize that a reality gap will often exist between a render and a real photo. Therefore, we rigorously evaluated our renders to make sure the reality gap was acceptable for our study. From ∼100 initially-purchased 3D models, we selected the 30 highest-quality models using the evaluation method below.
First, we quantitatively evaluated DNN predictions on the renders. For each object, we sampled 36 unique views (common in ImageNet) evenly divided into three sets. For each set, we set the object at the origin, the up direction to (0, 1, 0), and the camera position to (0, 0, −z) where z = {4, 6, 8}. We sampled 12 views per set by starting the object at a 10
• yaw and generating a render at every 30
• yaw-rotation. Across all objects and all renders, the Inception-v3 top-1 accuracy was 83.23% (compared to 77.45% on ImageNet images [44] ) with a mean top-1 confidence score of 0.78 (Table S2 ). See Sec. S1 for more details.
Second, we qualitatively evaluated the renders by comparing them to real photos. We produced 116 (real photo, render) pairs via three steps: (1) we retrieved real photos of an object (e.g., a car) from the Internet; (2) we replaced the object with matching background content in Adobe Photoshop; and (3) we manually rendered the 3D object on the background such that its pose closely matched that in the reference photo. Fig. S3 shows example (real photo, render) pairs. While discrepancies can be spotted in our side-byside comparisons, we found that most of the renders passed our human visual Turing test if presented alone.
Background images
Previous studies have shown that image classifiers may be able to correctly label an image when foreground objects are removed (i.e., based on only the background content) [57] . Because the purpose of our study was to understand how DNNs recognize an object itself, a non-empty background would have hindered our interpretation of the results. Therefore, we rendered all images against a plain background with RGB values of (0.485, 0.456, 0.406), i.e., the mean pixel of ImageNet images. Note that the presence of a non-empty background should not alter our main qualitative findings in this paper-adversarial poses can be easily found against real background photos (Fig. 1 ).
Methods
We will describe the common pose transformations (Sec. 3.1) used in the main experiments. We were able to ex-periment with non-gradient methods because: (1) the pose transformation space R 6 that we optimize in is fairly lowdimensional; and (2) although the NR is non-differentiable, its rendering speed is several orders of magnitude faster than that of DR. In addition, our preliminary results showed that the objective function considered in Eq. 1 is highly nonconvex (see Fig. 4 ), therefore, it is interesting to compare (1) random search vs. (2) gradient descent using finitedifference (FD) approximated gradients vs. (3) gradient descent using the DR gradients.
Pose transformations
We used standard computer graphics transformation matrices to change the pose of 3D objects [27] . Specifically, to rotate an object with geometry defined by a set of vertices V = {v i }, we applied the linear transformations in Eq. 2 to each vertex v i ∈ R 3 :
where R y , R p , and R r are the 3 × 3 rotation matrices for yaw, pitch, and roll, respectively (the matrices can be found in Sec. S6). We then translated the rotated object by adding a vector T = x δ y δ z δ to each vertex:
In all experiments, the center c ∈ R 3 of the object was constrained to be inside a sub-volume of the camera viewing frustum. That is, the x-, y-, and z-coordinates of c were within [−s, s], [−s, s], and [−28, 0], respectively, with s being the maximum value that would keep c within the camera frame. Specifically, s is defined as:
where θ v is one half the camera's angle of view (i.e., 8.213
• in our experiments) and d is the absolute value of the difference between the camera's z-coordinate and z δ .
Random search
In reinforcement learning problems, random search (RS) can be surprisingly effective compared to more sophisticated methods [41] . For our RS procedure, instead of iteratively following some approximated gradient to solve the optimization problem in Eq. 1, we simply randomly selected a new pose in each iteration. The rotation angles for the matrices in Eq. 2 were uniformly sampled from (0, 2π). x δ , y δ , and z δ were also uniformly sampled from the ranges defined in Sec. 3.1.
z δ -constrained random search
Our preliminary RS results suggest the value of z δ (which is a proxy for the object's size in the rendered image) has a large influence on a DNN's predictions. Based on this observation, we used a z δ -constrained random search (ZRS) procedure both as an initializer for our gradient-based methods and as a naive performance baseline (for comparisons in Sec. 4.4). The ZRS procedure consisted of generating 10 random samples of (x δ , y δ , θ y , θ p , θ r ) at each of 30 evenly spaced z δ from −28 to 0.
When using ZRS for initialization, the parameter set with the maximum target probability was selected as the starting point. When using the procedure as an attack method, we first gathered the maximum target probabilities for each z δ , and then selected the best two z δ to serve as the new range for RS.
Gradient descent with finite-difference
We calculated the first-order derivatives via finite central differences and performed vanilla gradient descent to iteratively minimize the cross-entropy loss L for a target class. That is, for each parameter w i , the partial derivative is approximated by:
Although we used an h of 0.001 for all parameters, a different step size can be used per parameter. Because radians have a circular topology (i.e., a rotation of 0 radians is the same as a rotation of 2π radians, 4π radians, etc.), we parameterized each rotation angle θ i as (cos(θ i ), sin(θ i ))-a technique commonly used for pose estimation [30] and inverse kinematics [11] -which maps the Cartesian plane to angles via the atan2 function. Therefore, we optimized in a space of 3 + 2 × 3 = 9 parameters. The approximate gradient ∇L obtained from Equation (5) served as the gradient in our gradient descent. We used the vanilla gradient descent update rule:
with a learning rate γ of 0.001 for all parameters and optimized for 100 steps (no other stopping criteria).
Experiments and results
Neural networks are easily confused by object rotations and translations
Experiment. To test DNN robustness to object rotations and translations, we used RS to generate samples for every 3D object in our dataset. In addition, to explore the impact of lighting on DNN performance, we considered three different lighting settings: bright, medium, and dark (example renders in Fig. S10 ). In all three settings, both the directional light and the ambient light were white in color, i.e., had RGB values of (1.0, 1.0, 1.0), and the directional light was oriented at (0, −1, 0) (i.e., pointing straight Misclassifications uniformly cover the pose space. For each object, we calculated the DNN accuracy (i.e., percent of correctly classified samples) across all three lighting settings (Table S5 ). The DNN was wrong for the vast majority of samples, i.e., the median percent of correct classifications for all 30 objects was only 3.09%. We verified the discovered adversarial poses transfer to the real world by using the 3D objects to reproduce natural, misclassified poses found on the Internet (see Sec. S3). High-confidence misclassifications (p ≥ 0.7) are largely uniformly distributed across every pose parameter (Fig. 3a) , i.e., AXs can be found throughout the parameter landscape (see Fig. S15 for examples). In contrast, correctly classified examples are highly multimodal w.r.t. the rotation axis angles and heavily biased towards z δ values that are closer to the camera ( Fig. 3b ; also compare Fig. S4 vs. Fig. S6 ). Intriguingly, for ball-like objects (not included in our main traffic dataset), the DNN was far more accurate across the pose space (see Sec. S8).
An object can be misclassified as many different labels. Previous research has shown that it is relatively easy to produce AXs corresponding to many different classes when optimizing input images [46] or 3D object textures [5] , which are very high-dimensional. When finding adversarial poses, one might expect-because all renderer parameters, including the original object geometry and textures, are held constant-the success rate to depend largely on the similarities between a given 3D object and examples of the target in ImageNet. Interestingly, across our 30 objects, RS discovered 990/1000 different ImageNet classes (132 of which were shared between all objects). When only considering high-confidence (p ≥ 0.7) misclassifications, our 30 objects were still misclassified into 797 different classes with a median number of 240 incorrect labels found per object (see Fig. S16 and Fig. S6 for examples) . Across all adversarial poses and objects, DNNs tend to be more confident when correct than when wrong (the median of median probabilities were 0.41 vs. 0.21, respectively).
Common object classifications are shared across different lighting settings
Here, we analyze how our results generalize across different lighting conditions. From the data produced in Sec. 4.1, for each object, we calculated the DNN accuracy under each lighting setting. Then, for each object, we took the absolute difference of the accuracies for all three lighting combinations (i.e., bright vs. medium, bright vs. dark, and medium vs. dark) and recorded the maximum of those values. The median "maximum absolute difference" of accuracies for all objects was 2.29% (compared to the median accuracy of 3.09% across all lighting settings). That is, DNN accuracy is consistently low across all lighting conditions. Lighting changes would not alter the fact that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial poses.
We also recorded the 50 most frequent classes for each object under the different lighting settings (S b , S m , and S d ). Then, for each object, we computed the intersection over union score o S for these sets:
The median o S for all objects was 47.10%. That is, for 15 out of 30 objects, 47.10% of the 50 most frequent classes were shared across lighting settings. While lighting does have an impact on DNN misclassifications (as expected), the large number of shared labels across lighting settings suggests ImageNet classes are strongly associated with certain adversarial poses regardless of lighting.
Correct classifications are highly localized in the rotation and translation landscape
To gain some intuition for how Inception-v3 responds to rotations and translations of an object, we plotted the probability and classification landscapes for paired parameters (e.g., Fig. 4 ; pitch vs. roll) while holding the other parameters constant. We qualitatively observed that the DNN's ability to recognize an object (e.g., a fire truck) in an image varies radically as the object is rotated in the world (Fig. 4) . Further, adversarial poses often generalize across similar objects (e.g., 83% of the sampled poses were misclassified for all 15 four-wheeled vehicle objects). Experiment. To quantitatively evaluate the DNN's sensitivity to rotations and translations, we tested how it responded to single parameter disturbances. For each object, we randomly selected 100 distinct starting poses that the DNN had correctly classified in our random sampling runs. Then, for each parameter (e.g., yaw rotation angle), we randomly sampled 100 new values 1 while holding the others constant. For each sample, we recorded whether or not the object remained correctly classified, and then computed the failure (i.e., misclassification) rate for a given (object, parameter) pair. Plots of the failure rates for all (object, parameter) combinations can be found in Fig. S18 .
Additionally, for each parameter, we calculated the median of the median failure rates. That is, for each parameter, we first calculated the median failure rate for all objects, and then calculated the median of those medians for each parameter. Further, for each (object, starting pose, parameter) triple, we recorded the magnitude of the smallest parameter change that resulted in a misclassification. Then, for each (object, parameter) pair, we recorded the median of these minimum values. Finally, we again calculated the median of these medians across objects (Table 1) . Results. As can be seen in Table 1 , the DNN is highly sensitive to all single parameter disturbances, but it is especially sensitive to disturbances along the depth (z δ ), pitch (θ p ), and roll (θ r ). To aid in the interpretation of these results, we converted the raw disturbance values in Table 1 to image units. For x δ and y δ , the interpretable units are the number of pixels the object shifted in the x or y directions of the image (however, note that 3D translations are not equivalent to 2D translations due to the perspective projection).
We found that a change in rotation as small as 8.02
• can cause an object to be misclassified (Table 1) . Along the spatial dimensions, a translation resulting in the object moving as few as 2 px horizontally or 4.5 px vertically also caused the DNN to misclassify. 2 Lastly, along the z-axis, a change in "size" (i.e., the area of the object's bounding box) of only 5.4% can cause an object to be misclassified.
Optimization methods can effectively generate targeted adversarial poses
Given a challenging, highly non-convex objective landscape (Fig. 4) [46] . Here, we compare (1) random search; (2) gradient descent with finite-difference gradients (FD-G); and (3) gradient descent with analytical, approximate gradients provided by a differentiable renderer (DR-G) [19] . Experiment. Because our adversarial pose attacks are inherently constrained by the fixed geometry and appearances of a given 3D object (see Sec. 4.1), we defined the targets to be the 50 most frequent incorrect classes found by our RS procedure for each object. For each (object, target) pair, we ran 50 optimization trials using ZRS, FD-G, and DR-G. All treatments were initialized with a pose found by the ZRS procedure and then allowed to optimize for 100 iterations.
Results. For each of the 50 optimization trials, we recorded both whether or not the target was hit and the maximum target probability obtained during the run. For each (object, target) pair, we calculated the percent of target hits and the median maximum confidence score of the target labels (see Table 2 ). As shown in Table 2 , FD-G is substantially more effective than ZRS at generating targeted adversarial poses, having both higher median hit rates and confidence scores. In addition, we found the approximate gradients from DR to be surprisingly noisy, and DR-G largely underperformed even non-gradient methods (ZRS) (see Sec. S5).
Adversarial poses transfer to different image classifiers and object detectors
The most important property of previously documented AXs is that they transfer across ML models, enabling blackbox attacks [55] . Here, we investigate the transferability of our adversarial poses to (a) two different image classifiers, AlexNet [20] and ResNet-50 [16] , trained on the same ImageNet dataset; and (b) an object detector YOLOv3 [34] Hit Rate (%) Target Prob. Table 2 : The median percent of target hits and the median of the median target probabilities for random search (ZRS), gradient descent with finite difference gradients (FD-G), and DR gradients (DR-G). All attacks are targeted and initialized with z δ -constrained random search. † DR-G is not directly comparable to FD-G and ZRS (details in Sec. S4).
trained on the MS COCO dataset [22] .
For each object, we randomly selected 1,350 AXs that were misclassified by Inception-v3 with high confidence (p ≥ 0.9) from our untargeted RS experiments in Sec. 4.1. We exposed the AXs to AlexNet and ResNet-50 and calculated their misclassification rates. We found that almost all AXs transfer with median misclassification rates of 99.9% and 99.4% for AlexNet and ResNet-50, respectively. In addition, 10.1% of AlexNet misclassifications and 27.7% of ResNet-50 misclassifications were identical to the Inception-v3 predicted labels.
There are two orthogonal hypotheses for this result. First, the ImageNet training-set images themselves may contain a strong bias towards common poses, omitting uncommon poses (Sec. S7 shows supporting evidence from a nearest-neighbor test). Second, the models themselves may not be robust to even slight disturbances of the known, indistribution poses. Object detectors. Previous research has shown that object detectors can be more robust to adversarial attacks than image classifiers [25] . Here, we investigate how well our AXs transfer to a state-of-the-art object detectorYOLOv3. YOLOv3 was trained on MS COCO, a dataset of bounding boxes corresponding to 80 different object classes. We only considered the 13 objects that belong to classes present in both the ImageNet and MS COCO datasets. We found that 75.5% of adversarial poses generated for Inception-v3 are also misclassified by YOLOv3 (see Sec. S2 for more details). These results suggest the adversarial pose problem transfers across datasets, models, and tasks.
Adversarial training
One of the most effective methods for defending against OoD examples has been adversarial training [15] , i.e. augmenting the training set with AXs-also a common approach in anomaly detection [9] . We tested whether adversarial training can improve DNN robustness to new poses generated for (1) our 30 training-set 3D objects; and (2) seven held-out 3D objects (see Sec. S9 for details). Fol-lowing adversarial training, the accuracy of the DNN substantially increased for known objects ( Table 3 : The median percent of misclassifications (Error) and high-confidence (i.e., p > 0.7) misclassifications by the pre-trained AlexNet (PT) and our AlexNet trained with adversarial examples (AT) on random poses of training-set objects (T) and held-out objects (H).
Related work
Out-of-distribution detection. OoD classes, i.e., classes not found in the training set, present a significant challenge for computer vision technologies in real-world settings [38] . Here, we study an orthogonal problem-correctly classifying OoD poses of objects from known classes. While rejecting to classify is a common approach for handling OoD examples [17, 38] , the OoD poses in our work come from known classes and thus should be assigned correct labels. 2D adversarial examples. Numerous techniques for crafting AXs that fool image classifiers have been discovered [55] . However, previous work has typically optimized in the 2D input space [55] , e.g., by synthesizing an entire image [29] , a small patch [18, 13] , a few pixels [8] , or only a single pixel [40] . But pixel-wise changes are uncorrelated [28] , so pixel-based attacks may not transfer well to the real world [24, 26] because there is an infinitesimal chance that such specifically crafted, uncorrelated pixels will be encountered in the vast physical space of camera, lighting, traffic, and weather configurations. [54] generated spatially transformed adversarial examples that are perceptually realistic and more difficult to defend against, but the technique still directly operates on pixels. 3D adversarial examples. Athalye et al. [5] used a 3D renderer to synthesize textures for a 3D object such that, under a wide range of camera views, the object was still rendered into an effective AX. We also used 3D renderers, but instead of optimizing textures, we optimized the poses of known objects to cause DNNs to misclassify (i.e., we kept the textures, lighting, camera settings, and background image constant). Concurrent work. We describe below two concurrent attempts that are closely related to ours. First, Liu et al. [23] proposed a differentiable 3D renderer and used it to perturb both an object's geometry and the scene's lighting to cause a DNN to misbehave. However, their geometry perturbations were constrained to be infinitesimal so that the visibility of the vertices would not change. Therefore, their result of minutely perturbing the geometry is effectively similar to that of perturbing textures [5] . In contrast, we performed 3D rotations and 3D translations to move an object inside a 3D space (i.e., the viewing frustum of the camera).
Second, Engstrom et al. [12] showed how simple 2D image rotations and translations can cause DNNs to misclassify. However, these 2D transformations still do not reveal the type of adversarial poses discovered by rotating 3D objects (e.g., a flipped-over school bus; Fig. 1d ).
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to harness 3D objects to study the OoD poses of wellknown training-set objects that cause state-of-the-art ImageNet classifiers and MS COCO detectors to misclassify.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we revealed how DNNs' understanding of objects like "school bus" and "fire truck" is quite naivethey can correctly label only a small subset of the entire pose space for 3D objects. Note that we can also find realworld OoD poses by simply taking photos of real objects (Sec. S3). We believe classifying an arbitrary pose into one of the object classes is an ill-posed task, and that the adversarial pose problem might be alleviated via multiple orthogonal approaches. The first is addressing biased data [49] . Because ImageNet and MS COCO datasets are constructed from photographs taken by people, the datasets reflect the aesthetic tendencies of their captors. Such biases can be somewhat alleviated through data augmentation, specifically, by harnessing images generated from 3D renderers [39, 4] . From the modeling view, we believe DNNs would benefit from the incorporation of 3D information, e.g., [4] .
Finally, our work introduced a new promising method (Fig. 2) for testing computer vision DNNs by harnessing 3D renderers and 3D models. While we only optimize a single object here, the framework could be extended to jointly optimize lighting, background image, and multiple objects, all in one "adversarial world". Not only does our framework enable us to enumerate test cases for DNNs, but it also serves as an interpretability tool for extracting useful insights about these black-box models' inner functions.
